Division of public contracts into lots and bid rigging:can economic theory provide an answer? by Giosa, Pinelopi
Division of Public Contracts Into Lots and Bid Rigging: Can Economic Theory 
Provide an Answer?  
Penelope Alexia Giosa* 
Splitting large public contracts into lots fosters competition in the long and short run 
and enhances the participation of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in public 
procurement proceedings. However, the division of contracts into lots can also 
facilitate anticompetitive practices, such as bid rigging. In order to deal with this, 
economic theory has established two basic rules. The first one is that the number of 
lots should be smaller than the expected number of participants. The second one is 
that the contracting authorities should define at least one lot more than the number of 
incumbents and reserve it to new entrants. This paper discusses these rules and 
investigates to what extent they can indeed cope successfully with bid rigging.  As it 
will be proved, they are not panacea for all cases of bid rigging and it is not always 
practically possible to apply them. Therefore, they need further elaboration and 
amendments. Suggestions will be made about how we could make them more effective. 
Some of these recommendations are based on ideas taken from the legal regime of 
USA. 
I. Introduction 
It has been a long-standing belief that dividing large public contracts into lots 
“extends the supplier and provider base to small and medium size enterprises 
(“SMEs”)”, while competition is enhanced in the long and short run.1 However, apart 
from fostering competition, the division of contracts into lots can also facilitate anti-
competitive activities such as bid rigging. Bid rigging is an explicit agreement that 
bidding firms usually make with the aim of not tendering at all or with the aim of 
tendering but in such a way that they may not be competitive with one of the other 
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bidders.2 As a result, the outcome of any sale or purchasing process in which bids are 
submitted can be adversely affected.3  
In order to prevent collusive practices when the public contract is split into lots, the 
economic theory has underlined that two vital rules should always apply. The first one 
is that the number of lots should be smaller than the expected number of participants. 
The second one is that the contracting authorities should define at least one lot more 
than the number of incumbents and reserve it to new entrants. In this paper, the author 
is scrutinising the aim as well as the content of these two intuitive rules of the 
economic theory and she tries to answer the research question to what extent they can 
successfully cope with bid rigging. The analysis will focus on the weaknesses that are 
still to be overcome when applying these two prescriptions, without referring to 
specific markets/industries but by using some exemplary case scenarios that can be 
met in various markets and industries, as explained below. As it will be proved, the 
aforementioned rules of the economic theory are not panacea for all cases, but they 
need further elaboration and amendments, especially in view of the fact that the 
weaknesses arising from them remain unaddressed by the new Public Sector Directive 
2014/24/EU (hereinafter “2014/24/EU Directive”). Hence, before concluding, some 
recommendations will also be made in order to render them more effective. 
In view of the above, this paper is structured as follows. After this introduction, 
section II provides some background information that lays out the legal framework for 
division of public contracts into lots in Europe, in order to avoid jumping directly into 
the core issues, without setting the general context. In the same section, it is explained 
why we should care about collusive practices, such as bid rigging, in the area of 
public procurement and specifically when public contracts are divided into lots bid. 
Section III explains the content of the first rule of the economic theory and monitors 
all the points that are rather weak and incompatible with the effective confrontation of 
bid rigging. Section IV examines the second rule of the economic theory and 
highlights its various practical hindrances as well as the fact that several European 
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Member States may not ensure preferential treatment for SMEs, which is a 
prerequisite for the successful application of the rule. In Section V some 
recommendations are made in order to make the current rules of the economic theory 
more effective. Some of these recommendations are based on ideas taken from the 
legal regime of USA. In Section VI the Article draws the main conclusions resulted 
from the whole analysis.   
II. Background Information and Significance of the Paper 
Procurement planning is the first phase of the public procurement process, in which 
decisions are made about which goods or services are to be bought and when. At this 
stage, contracting authorities can also consider whether they will divide a contract 
into lots or not. Article 46, paragraph 1 of 2014/24/EU Directive contemplates that 
contracting authorities have the discretion to decide whether they will award a 
contract in the form of separate lots or not and they are free to determine the size and 
subject-matter of such lots. Similarly, the European legislator gives Member States an 
option to render mandatory the splitting of public contracts.4 If this option is not made 
by a specific Member State, like the UK which did not implement such an obligation 
or the Netherlands and Belgium that have adopted rather “loose regulations” 
regarding this issue,5 contracting authorities are obliged to give reasons why they 
decided not to split the contract into lots (“Divide or explain formula”).6 This means 
that in case of non-mandatory provision in a Member State, still the division of 
contracts into lots is the default approach, as any opposite decision taken by a 
contracting authority shall be justified by having to provide the “main reasons” in the 
procurement documents or in the individual report which is required under Article 84 
of 2014/24/EU Directive.7 
As already highlighted in the Introduction, the division of contracts into lots can 
favour anti-competitive activities such as bid rigging. Bid rigging can take place when 
                                                          
4 Article 46, paragraph 4 of the Directive 2014/24/EU 
5 Manuel Zimmermann “Economic Efficiency and the Division of Large Procurement Contracts into 
Lots: An Analysis”(2017)4 EPPPL, p. 423 
6 Martin Trybus and Marta Andrecka “Favouring Small and Medium Sized Enterprises with Directive 
2014/24/EU?” (2017)3 EPPPL, p. 229; Ignacio Herrera Anchustegui “Division into Lots and Demand 
Aggregation- Extremes Looking for the Correct Balance?” in Grith S. Ølykke and Albert Sanchez-Graells 
(eds), Reformation or Deformation of the EU Public Procurement Rules (Edward Elgar, 2016), p. 126 
7 SIGMA and OECD “Brief 36- Division off Contracts into Lots” 
˂www.sigmaweb.org/publications/Public-Procurement-Policy-Brief-36-200117.pdf˃ accessed 25 
January 2018, p. 4 
a public contract is divided into lots because the simultaneous awarding of lots by the 
same contracting authority may give the opportunity to economic operators that 
usually submit bids for all lots to “share the pie”, as they can ensure in this way the 
possession of at least one lot for each of them.8 But, even if the format in the award of 
multiple lots is not simultaneous but sequential, still collusion between economic 
operators can be enhanced, because they have the ability to “identify defections from 
the collusive agreement and to react quickly within the same sequential award”.9 
Additionally, the frequent interactions of economic operators when they bid for 
multiple lots, as well as the pre-announcement of a series of tenders for awarding the 
lots of a public contract can increase the likelihood of collusive practices like bid 
rigging.10  
The reason why we should care about collusive practices, such as bid rigging, is that 
they undermine the very purpose of dividing contracts into lots. To be more specific, 
bid rigging can decrease the allocative efficiency, meaning “the allocation of the 
entire procurement to the economic operator(s) that are willing and able to provide the 
goods or service for the highest value/price quotient”.11 If for some reason, like bid 
rigging, the economic operators that were awarded with the lots of a public contract 
do not offer the highest possible value/price quotient but they submit an artificially 
raised price in order to maximise their profits, the public sector fails to achieve the 
best value for money. The consequences of this outcome are even more dramatic 
when a public contract is split into lots, because in that case not only the value for 
money is not achieved, but also increased transaction costs accrue, i.e. costs related to 
and accompanied with the division of contract into lots, as the contracting authority 
has to administer more than one award procedure and separate evaluations have to be 
made for each of the lots procured.12 As a result, the increased transaction costs in 
combination with the payment of great amounts of money to undeserving suppliers 
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cause loss to the government’s budget and this loss is ultimately borne by the 
taxpayers.  
III. The Number of Lots Should Be Smaller than the Expected Number of 
Participants: What Is Wrong With This?  
The first prescription is that the number of lots should be smaller than the expected 
number of participants.13 The auction literature as well as the economic theory 
suggests this in order to prevent firms from sharing the lots as if they were spoils 
divided up among them at a low price.14 In other words, the purpose of the first 
criterion is to make it harder for colluding tenderers to coordinate and share the pie 
between them, since the discrepancy between the participants and the number of lots 
means there will be bid riggers unable to get a slice out of the cake. However, this 
rule has some limits, as it does not take into account the composition of firms in the 
market as well as the fact that they may operate in multiple markets.15 Another factor 
that is not particularly considered under this rule is the “numerical and dimensional 
distribution of lots”, in other words the lots’ exact configuration.16 When the size of 
the lots is heterogeneous and there is asymmetry in the value of lots, the scope of 
market sharing agreements may be reduced17 for two reasons. The first one is that the 
barriers to entry may be somewhat lowered when splitting the contract in one very 
high-value lot and one very low-value lot, as in this way the market opens up to 
SMEs, which are also able to bid.18 The second one is that the higher the asymmetry 
of lots, the bigger the differences in the contribution of ring members to the collusive 
gains. Since “the payoffs from participation in the ring are commensurate with the 
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contribution of each individual to the profitability of the ring”19, this means that the 
cooperative payoffs of each ring member will be different as well. This can be a great 
problem for the sustainability of a biding ring, especially when its ring members are 
symmetric. In case of a ring member that gets a small and low-value lot, its pay-off 
will be decreased as well and so this may serve as an incentive for it to deviate from 
the collusive agreement and undercut it in order to obtain extra profits.20 Despite the 
above reasons, the present rule of the economic theory does not contribute at all to the 
calculation of the optimal lot sizes and value, while these decisions are in the hands of 
the contracting authorities which have wide autonomy, according to 2014/24/EU 
Directive, to determine the size as well as the subject-matter of the lots.21 Hence, we 
could say that the rule plays second fiddle when it comes to the contracting 
authorities’ freedom to decide autonomously, without being subject to administrative 
or judicial supervision.  
Moreover, the rule cannot apply effectively to other forms that bid rigging can take, 
such as the cover bidding, bid rotation and subcontracting arrangements. Let us 
consider firstly the form of cover bidding. Suppose, for instance, that a ministry is 
equipping a new office with furniture. The contract is split into lots so that separate 
competitions may take place for the desks and the associated items, chairs, storage 
units, meeting room furniture and so on.22 In case of cover bidding, one or more of 
the tenderers will submit offers at an intentionally high price or at least higher than 
the bid of the designated winner or having special terms which were not contemplated 
in the contract notice. As a result, the relevant contracting authority will probably 
reject these offers and it will award all or several of the contract lots to the designated 
winner. This is something that can very possibly happen in view of 2014/24/EU 
Directive which in Recital 79 allows for package bidding, meaning that a bidder is 
able to offer a single price for a set of items. Package bidding is permissible if after 
the determination of the tenders that best fulfill the award criteria laid down for each 
individual lot, the contracting authorities conduct a comparative assessment of these 
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tenders with the tenders submitted by a particular tenderer for a specific combination 
of lots and it turns out that the latter fulfill the relevant award criteria better than the 
tenders for the individual lots concerned seen in isolation.23 Article 46, paragraph 2 of 
2014/24/EU Directive is in the same line with Recital 79 and it contemplates that 
where the application of the award criteria results in one tenderer being awarded more 
lots than the maximum number of lots per tenderer, which is stated in the contract 
notice or in the invitation to confirm interest, contracting authorities shall indicate in 
the procurement documents the objective and non-discriminatory criteria or rules they 
intend to apply.  
Let us now deal with the form of bid rotation. Suppose that a hospital wants to re-
tender a facilities management contract that covers many non-medical services, such 
as cleaning, security, building maintenance, catering etc. Though a total facilities 
management single contract is feasible, contracting authorities may opt for separate 
competitions for each element.24 This may be the case if, for instance, a contracting 
authority is not satisfied with the joint venture that had previously won the total 
facilities management contract or if it wants to open competition to SMEs as well. 
Under these circumstances, the contracting authority may decide that the duration of 
each single service contract, like the contract for cleaning services, will be only two 
years because of its simple nature.25 Since the single service contracts, contrary to the 
complex bundled contracts, are generally planned to be re-tendered pretty soon, it is 
very possible for the bidders to agree on the submission of the lowest bid on a rotating 
basis. Such an anti-competitive practice of course cannot be prevented by just fixing 
the ratio between the number of potential bidders and the number of lots, which tries 
to deliver more competition for the lots without providing for any way that the timing 
and extent of the contract division could become unpredictable.   
Regarding the third form that bid rigging can take, namely the subcontracting 
arrangements when they are made as a payback (“quid pro quo”), imagine that a 
public contract is based on the most economically advantageous offer “(MEAT”) and 
it is split into two lots. For the first lot, tenderer A submits an offer of 200,000 EUR, 
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tenderer B submits an offer of 180,000 EUR, while tenderer C submits an offer of 
190,000. For the second lot tenderer B submits an offer of 160,000 EUR, while 
tenderer C submits an offer for 130,000 EUR. Though from a pure economic 
perspective, the first lot should have been awarded to tenderer B and the second lot to 
tenderer C, the contracting authority held that the offer of tenderer C for the first lot 
was much better than the offer of tenderer B on the basis of the best price-quality 
ratio. Therefore, tenderer C undertakes to perform all the two lots in virtue of Recital 
79 and Article 46, paragraph 2 of 2014/24/EU Directive. After the award of the 
contract, tenderer C subcontracts part of the contract’s services to an undertaking that 
under normal conditions would bid for the first lot of the contract, acting in this way 
as tenderer D, but it eventually did not bid because it agreed with tenderer C that the 
latter would subcontract a share of the contract to it. This issue cannot be fixed by just 
dividing the contract into an optimal number of lots (i.e. two lots while the 
participants are three), as still bid rigging can take place in the form of subcontracting 
arrangements.  
Apart from the above, a rule like this one that relates the number of bidders with the 
number of lots cannot have application in case of public contracts that must be 
awarded as soon as possible. In order to be able to predict the expected number of 
participants (emphasis added), there should be plenty of time for a contracting 
authority to go to market, investigate it and plan the procurement procedure. 
Indicatively, a health authority in the UK which was looking for solutions to provide 
low carbon ward lighting had to put the unmet need into a procurement call two years 
before the lighting was actually needed.26 When the needs that a public contract must 
cover are urgent, contracting authorities do not have at their disposal the time to 
predict and calculate the number of undertakings that would be expected to take part 
in the procurement process. Things can become even more complicated when it 
comes to procurements of innovative solutions. It may be particularly difficult for a 
contracting authority to map the competitive landscape by gauging whether the 
suggested contract or a similar one has been delivered on the market before. For this 
reason, in such cases the calculation of the expected number of participants 
presupposes preliminary market consultations. Yet, as already noted above, it usually 
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takes between three and six months for a consultation process to take place.27 What is 
more, until recently “most EU institutions had no policy for preliminary market 
consultations prior to starting the formal procurement procedure”.28 “A legal basis 
clarifying the regime for a preliminary market consultation has only been introduced 
by the modifications of the Financial Regulation and Rules of Applications and 
entered into force on 1st January 2016”.29 Hence, it is not always practically possible 
to gauge or to gauge timely and successfully the expected number of participants in a 
public procurement process in order to adjust beforehand the number of lots in which 
the contract will be divided.  
Last but not least, there are procurements where “the technical aspects of supply 
require a very large number of lots”30, like in case of medicines.  In these markets, it 
is not always feasible to define the number of lots in accordance with the expected 
number of participants, as priority is to procure a great variety of innovative 
medicines that will be readily available in the hospital pharmacy, regardless of the 
participating suppliers’ number.  
IV. At Least One Lot More Than the Number of Incumbents, Reserved to New 
Entrants: What Is Wrong With This? 
The second prescription that the auction literature and the economic theory recognises  
is that the contracting authorities should define at least one lot more than the number 
of incumbent firms and reserve it to new entrants.31 The special treatment of new 
entrants acts like a carrot that encourages the participation of several weak bidders in 
the public procurement process, as they now face a reasonable probability of success 
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by having the chance to accomplish certain parts of the project. At the same time, this 
can improve the aggressiveness of stronger bidders, since the submission of bids by 
new bidders that enter the process in order to improve the procurement outcome, can 
drive down the prices on all lots, even if the new bidders will not be successful at the 
end of the day. Such a thing fosters competition in the market not only in the short but 
also in the long term, as the experience that new bidders gain in this way will render 
them considerable competitors in future tenders.   
Despite its good intentions, the effect and application of this rule may be rather 
limited in practice. The main reason for this is the broad margin of discretion given to 
contracting authorities by 2014/24/EU Directive, which means that it is up to them 
whether and to what extent they will apply the rule. The significance of this parameter 
becomes obvious if it is considered in combination with the overall tension of the 
European Member States not to give a preferential treatment to SMEs. Data from 
EuroPAM (“European Public Accountability Mechanisms”) in the area of public 
procurement supports this. EuroPAM is an “observatory of European transparency 
legislation, similar to national procurement portals” and one of the areas it covers is 
public procurement.32 EuroPAM is also one of the watchdog tools that DIGIWHIST 
(“Digital Whistleblower”) project has in order to identify systemic vulnerabilities in 
the respective legislations and their implementation. Before proceeding to the 
assessment of EuroPAM data, it is important to highlight the fact that in an empirical 
study of PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) commissioned by the European Commission 
in 2014, it was proved that “breaking tenders down into lots is one of the most 
important tools to help SMEs access public contracts”, while one of the scatter 
diagrammes in the same study suggested that “there was some marginal correlation 
between the median value of single awards (lots) and the proportion of these contracts 
won by SMEs in the EU”.33 This conclusion is also supported by Piga and Zanza34 
who conclude that SME participation in public procurement processes is mainly 
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achieved by splitting tenders into lots that can be bid for separately, as well as by 
Sandholm.35 However, in another empirical study that regarded only the sector of 
defence, it was found that splitting a public contract into lots does not automatically 
increase the chances of successful SME participation, because some aspects of the 
tender, like SMEs’ competence in matters of procedure for participation in public 
tenders, should get improved.36  
Regarding the data of EuroPAM, the author accessed and studied the database which 
is relevant to the public procurement legal and regulatory norms of each European 
Member State in 2015.37 One of the issues investigated in that particular collection of 
public procurement rules was whether there is a preferential treatment for SMEs in 
every European Member State in 2015 (Qual-27 in the Microsoft Excel document). 
The rules that give preferential treatment for SMEs usually refer directly to this 
purpose. After studying the answers that were given regarding this issue based on the 
legislation of each Member State, it is concluded that only seven out of twenty eight 
European Member States did actually have in 2015 a preferential treatment for SMEs. 
To make things worse, from these seven European countries, most of them had not 
taken any specific measures to ensure this preferential treatment, but they were 
content with general provisions. Austria, Germany and Hungary are illustrative 
examples, while Belgium made provision for “economies of social insertion” only for 
tenders below the EU thresholds. France had the most detailed rules about reserved 
contracts for SMEs and Italy being in compliance with the Community rules, 
contemplated that where possible and cost-effective, contracts should be split into 
functional lots. In view of the overall unwillingness of European Member States to 
treat preferentially SMEs, it makes one wonder whether and to what extent 
contracting authorities will indeed reserve lot(s) of public contracts for SMEs, while 
they have the discretion in the virtue of the new Directive not to. 
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Furthermore, the above rule can face various practical hindrances. First of all, the 
special treatment of SMEs may raise issues of fairness and may run afoul of state aid 
rules and the principle of equal treatment.38 Secondly, to reserve one or more lots to a 
new entrant in the market, reducing in this way the number of lots available for 
incumbents does not necessarily enhance competition but quite the opposite, it may 
weaken competition for all lots.39 Strong bidders may disappear from the market 
altogether if they cannot get a share of sizeable procurement contracts.40 Thirdly, 
defining just one lot more than the number of incumbents and reserving it to new 
entrants does not guarantee that eventually the market will not be shared by 
incumbents.  Quite the opposite, the possibility of awarding more than one lots to the 
same tenderer, according to 2014/24/EU Directive (Recital (79) and Article 46, 
paragraph 2) together with the right that a bidder has to withdraw its tender anytime it 
decides so, may give an incentive either for collusion between incumbents and new 
entrants or for blackmail of the latter by the former. The fewer and weaker the new 
players in a market, the easier it is for incumbent firms to blackmail them or make 
them an offer of side-payment for the latter to withdraw their tender and so have the 
remaining lots shared by the incumbents. Similarly, in Netherlands the weak entrant 
was not able to participate in the procurement process until the end because it was 
threatened by an incumbent. 41 Although the new entrant complained to the 
government, the government took no action, “perhaps because excluding the 
incumbent firm would have ended the auction immediately and it might have been 
hard to impose a meaningful fine”.42 Things were worse in case of Italy where even a 
strong bidder (and not just a weak one) withdrew its tender at the last minute, 
supposedly because there had been collusion by which the firm at issue took part in 
the auction only to avoid invoking the rule reducing the number of licenses. 43 Apart 
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from Europe, it is also United States of America that suffered from the undesirable 
use of bid withdrawals as a strategic device. Indicatively, in spectrum auctions 
conducted by the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”), it was revealed that 
rather most of the bid withdrawals were used for undesirable bid signaling and in 
order to “acquire near the end of the auction more preferred licenses that seem to free 
up after the decline of another bidder”.44 
V. Recommendations  
For all the reasons mentioned above, the intuitive rules of economic theory that we 
just analysed are not panacea for all cases. In order to render them more effective, 
particular attention should be paid to the transparency rules that govern procurement 
procedure when a public contract is split into lots. The less information is concealed 
about the bidder identities, the better the aforementioned rules can apply in practice, 
as it will be less likely for cover bidding, bid rotation and sub-contracting 
arrangements to take place. As already explained, these are the main forms of bid 
rigging schemes that do not fall within the scope of the first rule of the economic 
theory, as the optimal number of lots does not affect their implementation.   
Bid withdrawals is another issue that should be expressly arranged if we want both to 
discourage insincere bidding in public contracts divided into lots and to secure the 
optimal asymmetry between lots and economic operators until the end of the 
procurement process. A possible measure could be to enable bidders to withdraw their 
bids in at most two rounds of an auction, as FCC in USA already does.45  This 
measure, however, presupposes a great number of rounds and this does not always 
apply in all cases of procurement procedures contemplated under 2014/24/EU 
Directive, as it does in case of electronic auctions (Article 35 of the Directive). 
Another possible solution, inspired again by the legal regime of USA, could be to 
impose penalties when withdrawing a high bid.46 The penalty could be the difference 
between the withdrawn bid and the final sale price so that the damage suffered by the 
public purchaser may be remedied in this way.47 Yet, as we know, there are several 
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European systems of tort or delict which do not recognise the deterrence and penal 
function of civil liability, as the U.S law does48and most civil law systems have 
hostile approach towards punitive awards because they raise public policy concerns.49 
The reason that punitive damages are deemed to be contrary to public policy in 
Europe is that they deviate from the civil law’s compensatory logic, which is to 
restore the initial status (in integrum restitution) without entailing the enrichment of 
the injured party.50 Moreover, they imply “a quasi criminal sanction”51 while the 
procedure in which they are awarded is civil or administrative, as suggested in our 
own case.  In view of the above, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has tried to 
take a brave step in the direction of formally authorising the award of punitive 
damages by saying that in the domain of intellectual property, the Member States are 
not prohibited from introducing punitive damages as a measure where an intellectual 
property right has been infringed.52 Hence, it could be said that there is no reason why 
the same measure should not apply in case of bid withdrawals as well.  
In the further alternative, the author would suggest the complete forbiddance of bid 
withdrawals if they are not sufficiently justified by the relevant economic operators 
and if they are not accompanied with adequate evidence. Taking some examples from 
the U.S legislation, sufficient justification that would enable the bid withdrawal could 
be a clerical or mechanical error that was made in good faith (bona fide) and was not 
the result of gross negligence, but it is so fundamental in character that it may make 
the whole bid materially different from what the bidder initially intended it to be.53 
Another example of excusable mistake that would enable a bid withdrawal could be 
the occurrence of some unforeseen circumstances after submitting the bid. In any 
case, it is recommended that the mistake should be clearly evident and specified in 
detail in a written notice within strict deadlines from the submission of the request for 
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bid withdrawal. Where the mistake is obvious on its face, like in case of 
typographical, arithmetical, transposition errors or errors in extending unit price, the 
relevant contracting authorities should opt for its correction rather than proceeding to 
the withdrawal of the whole bid.54   
A last issue that, in the author’s opinion, should be clarified by the European 
legislator is the pricing strategy that a bidder can adopt when bundling of lots is 
permissible; otherwise it may serve as an additional incentive for incumbents to act 
illegally and outplace SMEs in the procurement process, as happened in the examples 
above that were taken from Netherlands and Italy. In subparagraph 1 of Article 46, 
paragraph 2, the 2014/24/EU Directive has left unaddressed the question whether the 
price that a bidder can offer for all the lots (or a combination of some) can be lower 
than the one he offers for the individual lots. If this is the case, multiple bidding is 
favoured while value for money can be achieved by the public purchaser. Yet, at the 
same time concerns may arise regarding the intensity of competition and the 
participation of SMEs in the relevant market, as such a thing not only tends to expand 
opportunities for incumbents but it also incentivises them to use any illegal method, 
like offer of side-payment or blackmail, in order to displace weak market players and 
keep the award of lots for themselves at the end of the procurement process. For this 
reason and also in view of the initial objective that the division of contracts into lots 
has, which is to facilitate the involvement of SMEs in the public procurement market, 
the author would say that this interpretation should be explicitly rejected, even if the 
value for money is compromised in this way.   
VI. Conclusion  
In this paper, an attempt was made to critically review the two basic rules of the 
economic theory that should apply every time in order to prevent collusive practices 
when the public contract is split into lots. We examined to what extent they can 
successfully cope with bid rigging and whether they need further elaboration and 
amendments. As we saw, the intuitive rules of economic theory are not applicable in 
all cases and there is need to make them more robust and effective by minimizing the 
amount of information disclosed about the bidder identities when a public contract is 
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split into lots as well as by regulating in a strict way the issue of bid withdrawals. 
From the analysis, it gets apparent that a possible measure could be to completely 
forbid bid withdrawals if they are not sufficiently justified by the relevant firms that 
request it and if their request is not accompanied with adequate evidence. It was also 
highlighted that the European legislator should not leave unaddressed the issue 
regarding the pricing strategy that a bidder can adopt when bundling of lots is 
permissible. If it is officially interpreted that the price which a bidder can offer for all 
the lots (or a combination of some) can be lower than the one he offers for the 
individual lots, the public purchaser will be benefitted in the short term by achieving 
value for money. Nevertheless, in the long term this means encouragement of big 
incumbent firms in the market to bid and exhaust all possibilities of winning multiple 
lots in the relevant procurement process to the detriment of SMEs. One of the means 
that may be used in order to achieve their goal is the circumvention of the division of 
public contracts into lots, as already explained below through several illustrative 
examples.   
As long as the aforementioned concerns and questions are not entirely overcome, the 
conditions that favour bid rigging are likely to arise at the stage of the pre-contractual 
procurement planning, where the contracting authorities make the decision about the 
division of public contracts into lots or not. As a result, it is very possible for bid 
rigging to take place at the next stage, i.e. the contracting phase. This is so because a 
procurement planning stage susceptible to bid rigging can constitute the ground for 
new or sustainable bid rigging practices at the competitive bidding stage. Therefore, 
the policy makers should not sit back and become complacent in the application of the 
two rules that the economic theory suggests every time a public contract is split into 
lots. On the contrary, they should be alert to the risks that may arise each time by 
issuing and adopting guidelines that would inform procurement officers about the 
above scenarios, achieving in this way the necessary degree of harmonisation when 
dealing with division of public contracts into lots.  
 
